The strategy of Syriza’s leadership has failed
miserably. But it’s not too late to avert total defeat.
by Stathis Kouvelakis Feb, Tuesday 24-15
INTRODUCTION by Hugo Adan Feb 25, 2915
I was wrong in my 1st perception on Stathis Kouvelakis, now that I finish reading
his original documents I rectify my approach and present my excuses.
My approach now is as follow:
1- Kouvelakis critique to leaders of Syriza should not be
interpreted as sign of divisionism but as an offer to recommence the struggle
against “la troika” (bureaucrats from the EU, the ECB & IMF) who manage to
put the Greek leaders against the wall. There was an asymmetric balance of
forces imposed during those negotiations. The result was an infamous doc that
is well described as retreat from people demands against austerity.
2- The recommence
suggested Stathis Kouvelakis I
will be interpreted as :
A. An immediate meeting of the CC to define a new strategy and tactics. In this meeting the previous
delegation should describe the traps used by the troika in the 1st
attempt to negotiate a fair deal with them. They should also propose
recommendations to face them. The CC will decide also the calling of a
referendum to solidify relation between leaders
and people. A team to write the
new proposal should be nominated.
B. If a national referendum is called people will be
asked to accept vs reject the infamous troika
blackmail document.
C. the CC will decide the Main coordinator of the new
delegation for negotiations with la troika. Stathis Kouvelakis is one of the options . In any he should be
incorporate as member of the team for negotiations. Their task is declaring
nule the previous doc and submit a new one for debate. Reasons:
a-lack of balance in previuos negotiation table;
b- non democratic dynamic in dialogues & decision
making process; and
c- the will of people as expressed in the
Referendum.
3- If Stathis Kouvelakis
does not accept the leading position in the delegation to negotiate a
deal with the Troika, the CC will make public his thank for his critique to the current situation.
Stathis Kouvelakis , is a teacher
of Politics in London King’s
College, a person who described perfectly
the sadist way in which la troika (ECB, EU bureaucrats & IMF) used
their diplomatic blackmail against Syriza leaders. His Document
“"The
Alternative In Greece" though it does not contain any alternative, is
a nice invitation to a debate on strategy. This will be the base to finally
“recommence the task of overcoming the present situation”, as said by
Kouvelakis in his critique. https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/02/syriza-greece-eurogroup-kouvelakis/
4- Greece nation is fortunate to have Stathis Kouvelakis”
as member of the Central Committee of Syriza and it is expected from him to
permanently consult the CC on anything that concern their destiny of the
nation, when leading the delegation for negotiations. . He will be the right
person to transform the failure of the 1sxt attempt into a great victory
against the common enemy of the nation.
His suggestion for inmediate debate on strategy and tactics should not be
delayed.
We all agree with him in that
truth is revolutionary when goes hand on hand with revolutionary praxis.
Hugo Adan]
====
"I apologise to the Greek
people because I have contributed to this illusion," Stathis
Kouvelakis
Let us begin with what should be indisputable: the
Eurogroup agreement that the Greek government was dragged into on Friday
amounts to a headlong
retreat.
The memorandum regime is to be
extended, the loan agreement and the totality of
debt recognized, “supervision,” another
word for troika rule, is to be continued under another
name, and there is now little chance Syriza’s
program can be implemented.
Such a thorough failure is not, and cannot be, a matter
of chance, or the product of an ill-devised tactical maneuver. It represents the defeat of a specific political line that has
underlain the government’s current approach.
FRIDAY’S AGREEMENT
In the spirit of the popular mandate for a break with the
memorandum regime and liberation from debt, the Greek side
entered negotiations rejecting the extension of the
current “program,” agreed to by the Samaras government, along with the €7 billion tranche, with
the exception of the €1.9 billion return on Greek bonds to which it was
entitled.
Not consenting to any supervisory
or assessment procedures, it requested a four-month
transitional “bridge program,” without austerity measures, to secure
liquidity and implement at least part of its program within balanced budgets.
It also asked that lenders recognize the non-viability
of the debt and the need for an immediate new round of across-the-board
negotiations.
But the final agreement amounts
to a point-by-point rejection of all these demands.
Furthermore, it entails another set of measures aimed at tying the hands of the
government and thwarting any measure that might signify a break with memorandum
policies.
In the Eurogroup’s Friday statement, the existing
program is referred to as an “arrangement,”
but this changes absolutely nothing essential. The “extension”
that the Greek side is now requesting (under the “Master Financial Assistance
Facility Agreement”) is to be enacted “in the framework
of the existing arrangement” and aims at “successful completion of the
review on the basis of the conditions in the current arrangement.”
It is also clearly stated that
only approval
of the conclusion of the review of the extended arrangement by the institutions … will allow
for any disbursement of the outstanding tranche of the current EFSF
programme and the transfer of the 2014 SMP profits
[these are the 1.9 billion of profits out of Greek bonds to which Greece is
entitled]. Both are again subject to approval by the Eurogroup.
So Greece will be receiving the
tranche it had initially refused, but on the
condition of sticking to the commitments of its predecessors.
What we have then is a reaffirmation of the typical German stance of imposing — as a precondition for any agreement and any future disbursement of funding —
completion of the “assessment” procedure by the tripartite
mechanism (whether this is called “troika” or
“institutions”) for supervision of every past and future agreement.
Moreover, to make it abundantly clear that the use of the
term “institutions” instead of the term “troika”
is window-dressing, the text specifically reaffirms the
tripartite composition of the supervisory mechanism, emphasizing that
the “institutions” include the ECB (“against
this background we recall the independence of the European Central Bank”) and the International Monetary Fund (“we also agreed that
the IMF would continue to play its role”).
As regards the debt, the
text mentions that “the Greek authorities reiterate their unequivocal commitment to honour their financial obligations
to all their creditors fully and timely.” In other words forget any discussion of “haircuts,” “debt reduction,” let
alone “writing off of the greater part of the debt,” as is Syriza’s
programmatic commitment.
Any future “debt relief” is
possible only on the basis of what was proposed in the November 2012 Eurogroup decision, that is to say a
reduction in interest rates and a rescheduling, which as is well-known makes little difference to the burden of servicing debt,
affecting only payment of interest that is already very low.
But this is not all,
because for repayment of debt the Greek side is
now fully accepting the same framework of Eurogroup decisions of November 2012, at
the time of the three-party government of Antonis Samaras. It included the
following commitments: 4.5% primary surpluses from 2016,
accelerated privatizations, and the
establishment of a special account for servicing the
debt — to which the Greek public sector was to transfer all the income
from the privatizations, the primary surpluses, and 30%
of any excess surpluses.
It was for this reason too that Friday’s text mentioned
not only surpluses but also “financing proceeds.” In any case, the heart of the memorandum heist, namely the
accomplishment of outrageous primary surpluses and the selling-off of public
property for the exclusive purpose of lining lenders’ pockets, remains intact. The sole hint of relaxation of
pressure is a vague assurance that “the institutions will, for the 2015 primary
surplus target, take the economic circumstances in 2015 into account.”
But it was not enough that the Europeans should reject
all the Greek demands. They had, in every way, to bind the Syriza government
hand and foot in order to demonstrate in practice that whatever
the electoral result and the political profile of the government that might
emerge, no reversal of austerity is feasible within the existing European
framework. As European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker stated,
“there can be no democratic choice against the European
treaties.”
And the provision for this is to take place in two ways.
Firstly, as indicated in the text: “The Greek
authorities commit to refrain from any rollback of measures and unilateral
changes to the policies and structural reforms that would negatively impact
fiscal targets, economic recovery or financial stability, as assessed by
the institutions.”
So no dismantling of the
memorandum regime either (“rollback of measures”), and no “unilateral changes,” and indeed not only as
regards measures with a budgetary cost (such as abolition of taxes, raising of
the tax-free threshold, increases in pensions, and “humanitarian” assistance)
as had been stated initially, but in a much more wide-ranging sense, including anything that could have a “negative impact” on
“economic recovery or financial stability,” always in accordance with
the decisive judgment of the “institutions.”
Needless to say this is relevant not only to the
reintroduction of a minimum wage and the reestablishment of the labor
legislation that has been dismantled these last years, but also to changes in
the banking system that might strengthen public control (not a word, of course,
about “public property” as outlined in Syriza’s founding declaration).
Moreover, the agreement specifies
that
the funds
so far available in the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) buffer should
be held by European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), free of third
party rights for the duration of the MFFA extension. The funds continue to be available for the duration of the
MFFA extension and can only be used for bank
recapitalisation and resolution costs. They will only be released on
request by the ECB/SSM.
This clause shows how it has not escaped the attention of
the Europeans that Syriza’s Thessaloniki program stated that “seed money for
the public sector and an intermediary body and seed money for the establishment
of special purpose banks, amounting to a total in the order of €3 billion, will
be provided through the HFSF’s so-called ‘cushion’ of around €11 billion for
the banks.”
In other words, goodbye to any
thought of using HFSF funds for growth-oriented objectives. Whatever
illusions still existed regarding the possibility of using European funds for
purposes outside of the straitjacket of those for which they had been earmarked
— and even more that they should be placed under the Greek government’s
jurisdiction — have thus been dispelled.
DEFEAT OF THE “GOOD EURO”
STRATEGY
Can the Greek side possibly believe that it has achieved
something beyond the impressive verbal inventiveness of the text? Theoretically
yes, insofar as there are no longer any explicit
references to austerity measures, and the “structural changes” mentioned (administrative
reforms and a clampdown on tax evasion) do not pertain to this category, a
modification which of course needs cross-checking against the list of measures
that can be expected to emerge in the coming days.
But given that the target of the outrageous budgetary
surpluses has been retained, along with the totality of the troika machinery of
supervision and assessment, any notion of relaxation of
austerity appears out of touch with reality. New measures, and of course
stabilization of the existing “memorandum acquis”
are a one-way street as long as the present regime prevails, is renamed, and is perpetuated.
It is clear from the above that in the course of the
“negotiations,” with the revolver of the ECB up against its head and resultant
panic in the banks, the Greek positions underwent near-total collapse. This
helps to explain the verbal innovations (“institutions” instead of “troika,” “current arrangements”
instead of “current program,” “Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement”
instead of “Memorandum,” etc.). Symbolic consolation or further
trickery, depending on how you look at it.
The question that emerges, of course, is HOW WE LANDED IN THIS QUANDARY. How is it possible
that, only a few weeks after the historic result of January 25, we have this
countermanding of the popular mandate for the overthrow of the memorandum?
The answer is simple: what
collapsed in the last two weeks is a specific strategic option that
has underlaid the entire approach of SYRIZA, particularly after 2012:
the strategy that excluded “unilateral moves” such
as suspension of payments and, even more so, exit
from the euro, and argued that:
- On the issue of the debt, a favorable solution for the debtor can be found with the concurrence of the lender, following the model of the London agreements of 1953 for the debts of Germany — ignoring of course the fact that the reasons the Allies behaved generously towards Germany do not in any way apply to the Europeans today vis à vis the Greek debt, and more generally the public debt of the over-indebted states of today’s EU.
- Overthrow of the memoranda, expulsion of the troika, and a different model of economic policy (in other words implementation of the Thessaloniki program) could be implemented irrespective of the outcome of debt negotiations and, above all, without triggering any real reaction from the Europeans, above and beyond the initial threats, which were dismissed as bluffing. Indeed, half of the funding for the Thessaloniki program was envisaged as coming from European resources. In other words, not only would the Europeans not have reacted, but they would have generously funded the opposite policies they had been imposing for the last five years.
- Finally, the “good euro” scenario presupposed the existence of allies of some significance at the level of governments and/or institutions (the reference here is not to the support from social movements or other leftist forces). The governments of France and Italy, the German social democrats, and finally, in a veritable frenzy of fantasy, Mario Draghi himself were from time to time invoked as such potential allies.
All of this came crashing down within the space of a few
days. On February 4 the ECB announced the suspension of
the main source of liquidity to Greek banks. The outflow that had
already started rapidly acquired uncontrollable dimensions, while the
Greek authorities, fearing that such a reaction would mark the
commencement of the Grexit, didn’t take the slightest “unilateral” measure
(such as imposition of capital controls).
The words “writing-off” of debt
and even “haircut” were rejected in the most categorical manner possible
by lenders who became enraged even hearing them (with the result that they were
almost immediately withdrawn from circulation). Instead of their overthrow, it
turned out that the only “non-negotiable” element was that of keeping the
memoranda and supervision by the troika. Not a single country supported the
Greek positions, above and beyond some diplomatic courtesies from those who
wanted the Greek government to be able, marginally, to save face.
Fearing the Grexit more than it feared its interlocutors,
entirely unprepared in the face of the absolutely predictable contingency of
bank destabilization (the system’s classical weapon internationally for almost
a century when faced by leftist governments), the Greek side was essentially
left without any bargaining tools whatsoever. It found itself with its back to
the wall and with only bad options at its disposal. Friday’s defeat was
inevitable and marks the end of the strategy of “a positive solution inside the
euro,” or to be more accurate “a positive solution at all costs inside the
euro.”
HOW TO AVERT TOTAL DEFEAT
Rarely has a strategy been confuted so unequivocally
and so rapidly. Syriza’s Manolis Glezos was therefore right to speak
of “illusion” and, rising to the occasion, apologize to the people for having contributed to cultivating
it. Precisely for the same reason, but conversely, and with the
assistance of some of the local media, the government has
attempted to represent this devastating outcome as a “negotiating
success,” confirming that “Europe is an arena for negotiation,” that it
is “leaving behind the Troika and the Memoranda” and other similar assertions.
Afraid to do what Glezos has dared to do — i.e.
acknowledge the failure of its entire strategy — the leadership is
attempting a cover-up, “passing off meat as fish,” to cite the popular
Greek saying.
But to present a defeat as a
success is perhaps worse than the defeat itself. On the one hand it
turns governmental discourse into cant, into a string of clichés and platitudes
that is simply summoned up to legitimate any decision retrospectively,
turning black into white; and on the other because it prepares the ground, ineluctably,
for the next, more definitive, defeats, because it
dissolves the criteria by which success
can be distinguished from retreat.
To make the point through recourse to a historical
precedent well-known to leftists, if the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, under which
Soviet Russia secured peace with Germany, accepting huge territorial losses,
had been proclaimed a “victory,” there is no doubt that the October Revolution
would have been defeated.
If, therefore, we wish to avert a
second, and this time decisive, defeat — which would put an end to the Greek leftist experiment,
with incalculable consequences for society and for the Left inside and outside
this country — we must look reality in the face
and speak the language of honesty. The debate on
strategy must finally recommence, without
taboos and on the basis of the congress resolutions of Syriza, which for some
time now have been turned into innocuous icons.
If Syriza still has a reason for existing as a
political subject, a force for the elaboration of emancipatory politics, and
for contribution to the struggles of the subordinated classes, it must be a
part of this effort to initiate an in-depth analysis of
the present situation and the means of overcoming it.
“The truth is revolutionary,” to cite the words of a
famous leader who knew what he was talking about. And only the truth is
revolutionary, we may now add, with the historical experience we have since
acquired.
------
THE headlong
retreat.
IS
SYRIZA RETREATING? Feb, Thursday 19-15
The latest from Europe is not good. Syriza appears to
have backtracked in negotiations, and Germany is seeking total surrender.
by Stathis Kouvelakis , Teaches Pol Theory
at king ‘s College of London
To use a worn-out cliché, “the times are critical.” In
fact, they are more than just that: we are at the edge of a crucial temporal
sequence. The whole endeavor of a Syriza government will be judged by its
reaction to the unprecedented blackmail and ultimatums
it is receiving from its tragically misnamed European “partners.”
And the news from the frontline is not pleasant. To be
sure, it is very difficult to have a clear view of the current status of the
negotiations — “negotiations” being an oxymoron given the sheer asymmetry in the balance of
forces, and the fact that one side has a gun (the European Central
Bank’s) pointed at its head. What is clear, however, is that the Greek government has backtracked on crucial aspects,
especially concerning its commitments towards the
people that brought it into office.
Before examining the substance of the request for an
extension of the “Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement” submitted on Wednesday by the Greek government to Brussels,
let’s have a closer look at the “Moscovici document”
leaked by the Greek government during the Eurogroup meeting last Monday, which
it has declared itself willing to sign.
This document (a) rules out “unilateral action,” (b) sets
primary surpluses of an undefined volume as a budgetary target, and(c) recognizes the entirety of the debt. (d) All
future adjustments made concerning the restructuring of the debt will have to
be in line with the Eurogroup’s decisions in November 2012.
Essentially, the implementation of the fundamental
measures of Syriza’s Thessaloniki
election program is made subject to the prior
approval of the lenders, effectively amounting to the program’s
annulment. Additionally, it recognizes the odious
terms of the lending agreements, thereby further
weakening the Greek negotiating position on the matter. It is obvious
that by accepting such a framework as a
supposedly “honorable compromise,” the Syriza
government is having its hands tied.
The request for an extension of the Master Financial
Assistance Facility Agreement includes all of the above-mentioned points and adds to those — for the first time — the
recognition of “the supervision under the [European
Union] and ECB framework and, in the same spirit, with the International Monetary Fund for the duration of
the extended Agreement (point f).” In other words, the
troika is back but with a different name. The Greek media
has already started talking about “the
Institutions.”
But even that is not enough for the EU and German Finance
Minister Wolfgang Schäuble. Having understood that the Greek side — eager to
avoid any rupture and even any unilateral move — is on a constant path of
retreat, the “partners” have opted for total surrender
as their primary aim.
By teaching the Syriza government a lesson, they
simultaneously issue a warning to Podemos and
any other force in Europe that may attempt to challenge austerity, the
memoranda, and debt peonage. The German side has
either way rejected the Greek request for the Master
Financial Assistance Facility Agreement, apparently aiming for further
Greek concessions and the full humiliation of the Greek
left-wing government.
And herein, maybe, lies hope. It can’t be ruled out that
the escalating demands of the EU and the lenders will be rejected by a
government that has undertaken some basic commitments to its people. And, more
importantly, that they will be rejected by a people that is believing in hope
again and taking to the country’s streets and squares. A retreat should not be treated as unavoidable, and the Greek
government deserves support to the extent that it holds firm in the war
unleashed against it.
Whatever the conclusion, one thing is certain. All the reassuring arguments that have circulated in the past
few years — about a European “bluff,” about the possibility of
overthrowing austerity within the eurozone framework, of separating lending
agreements and memoranda, of solutions in the lines of
the 1953 London conference on the German debt (that is, of a favorable restructuring for the borrower agreed by the lender)
— in other words, the constituent elements of the
narrative of the “good euro” — have all collapsed.
At some point, we are owed explanations about all this as
well.
====
Related document:
GREEK BAILOUT: SYRIZA DISSENTERS ACCUSE GOVERNMENT OF
RENEGING ON ELECTION PROMISES IN NEW EUROZONE DEAL
----
The Independent. Wednesday 25 February 2015
----
"I apologise to the Greek people because I have
contributed to this illusion," Stathis Kouvelakis
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