THE BUBLE. LA BURBUJA.
Hugo Adan. Feb 6, 2013
Todos sabemos que en los EU no es el Gobierno electo quien realmente gobierna, que detrás hay un
aparato supra-Estado que debate, propone y organiza la toma de decisiones del régimen
en el poder. Sabemos que ese aparato es coordinado por la CIA y el FBI y que a esta
instancia de poder Mr Lawrence le llama “la burbuja”. Quienes pertenecen a la burbuja?; no lo sabemos
pero Mr Lawrense si lo sabe y el menciono nombres y a la prensa grande -NYT
y WP- como posibles regulares invitados
(ver abajo entrevista reciente en Democracy Now, Feb 6,13). Por supuesto no mencionó
a los jerarcas y/o financistas de ambos
partidos, el demócrata y republicano, ni tampoco a altos jefes del military-industrial-complex,
ni a los grandes banqueros, ni algunos celebres lobistas, expertos en el arte
de mamar las tetas del Estado. Lo que sí
sabemos es que los jefes de gobierno re-electos como Roosevelt y hoy Obama, tienen
la posibilidad de participar en el reciclaje del eje coordinador de la burbuja,
y proponer a los altos jefes de la CIA y el FBI. Solo que esta vez el “cambiar
algo para que todo siga igual” no fue necesario, los que apoyaron la farsa
montada para la invasión y pillaje en Irak, han regresado y Mr Brennan va a ser
el jefe de la CIA y el derrotado John Kerry
será Secretario de Estado. Estos tendrán
ahora oportunidad de “golpear la piñata” y de recuperar lo que invirtieron
cuando either fueron candidatos frustrados or honestos y eficientes servidores
de secretos aparatos de Estado.
Para mi, que un alto ex agente de la CIA, el ex coronel y exjefe del “staff”
del Secretario de Defensa Mr Colin Powel, Don Lawrence Wilkerson mencione la
existencia de esa burbuja, eso puede significar dos cosas. A. Interes en afianzar
en la mente ciudadana que hay un organismo que si está cumpliendo con preservar
la seguridad de la nación y que a pesar de sus errores y quiéranlo o no
sus críticos, “esa burbuja” es como los hologramas que pueden verse y tocarse con dedos acusadores, con miles de
gentes protestando en las calles, pero jamás romperse (a menos que se corte la energía
o el circuito eléctrico) pero aun así, el superball interno entre ellos será quien defina la políticas en EU. Eso jamás se alteraría. Si
esa fue la intención de Mr. Lawerence, el ganó de lejos su debate con Mr Norman Salomón
y aquel puede ya aspirar al Board de una gran empresa encargada de negocios internacionales. Sin
duda sabe mucho de eso, aunque tendría que abandonar la arrogancia que mostro
al inicio del debate.
B. El debate indicaría también que son serios 2 problemas que perturba
la mente del inner circle o burbuja.
B1, los drones, que pueden generar no solo
repudio mundial contra EU, Israel, Saudis y UK en la ONU, pero además acciones de
violencia contra empresas, embajadas y ciudadanos de estos países en el
exterior. De esto no dice nada la media que ayer hizo escándalo por los WMD que no hubo en Irak.
B2 un error mas y adios. Lo sugirio OB: el contexto mundial no está para mas errores como el cometido en
Irak. La situación en Syria e Iran, donde mercenarios jijadistas han sido
ya instalados, con aval y dinero de EU está saliendo fuera del control de NATO y que esto puede escalar y generar una hecatombe nuclear
mundial de impredecibles consecuencias. La prensa no dice nada sobre ello. Esto es serio, por tanto urge sacar del gobierno
a quienes hicieron parte de la aventura militar errada en Irak, y sacar a los
agentes del Mosad del inner circle o burbuja. Urge además revisar la relación con
los fundamentalistas islámicos y romper con aliados que si estan poniendo en peligro la
paz mundial.
-----------------------
DECADE AFTER IRAQ WMD
SPEECH AT UN, EX-POWELL AIDE LAWRENCE WILKERSON DEBATE CON NORMAN SOLOMON
Extractos.
SECRETARY OF STATE COLIN POWELL: One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the thick intelligence file we have on Iraq’s biological weapons is the existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological agents. Let me take you inside that intelligence file and share with you what we know from eyewitness accounts. We have firsthand descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails. The trucks and train cars are easily moved and are designed to evade detection by inspectors. In a matter of months, they can produce a quantity of biological poison equal to the entire amount that Iraq claimed to have produced in the years prior to the Gulf War.
AMY GOODMAN: At the time, most of the media took Powell at his word. The
day after Powell’s speech, The New York Times ran an editorial called "The Case Against
Iraq." It said Powell’s performance was, quote, "all the more
convincing because he dispensed with apocalyptic invocations of a struggle of
good and evil and focused on shaping a sober, factual case against Mr.
Hussein’s regime," unquote. The Washington Post titled its
editorial "Irrefutable" and declared, quote, "it is hard to
imagine how anyone could doubt that Iraq possesses weapons of mass
destruction," unquote. Well, the invasion began six weeks after Powell
made his speech at the U.N.
For more, we’re joined by two
people. From Oklahoma City, we’re joined by Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson. He
served as chief of staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell from 2002 to 2005.
He helped prepare Powell’s infamous U.N. speech, which he has since renounced.
And from San Francisco, California, we’re joined by Norman Solomon, founding
director of the Institute for Public Accuracy, also wrote the book War Made
Easy: How Presidents and Pundits Keep Spinning Us to Death.
We welcome you both to Democracy
Now! Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, let’s begin with you. You really were
responsible for putting this speech together for Secretary of State Powell.
It’s 10 years later. What are your thoughts today? Where did you get your
information?
COL. LAWRENCE WILKERSON: First of all, Amy, I don’t believe that the hype about that
presentation having been the ultimate presentation, as it were, that led us to
war with Iraq. George W. Bush, Dick Cheney and others had decided to go to war
with Iraq long before Colin Powell gave that presentation. That said, that
presentation was a moment in time that convinced a lot of people, in America
first, in the international community, maybe even on the U.N. Security Council
in one or two cases, that they had been previously wrong to doubt that he had
weapons of mass destruction. And in that sense, it added to the momentum of the
war. President Bush himself has written in his book, had he known that there
were no WMD, he might have made a different decision. I don’t think Richard
Cheney would have made a different decision. But it wasn’t the seminal moment
that sent us into war; it was just one of those moments. And as one of those
moments, as I’ve said before and as you quoted me, I feel like it was the
lowest point in my professional and personal life that I had a hand in managing
it.
AMY GOODMAN: How did you—where did the information come from? Explain
how you did put this together.
COL. LAWRENCE WILKERSON: The information came from our intelligence system at the
time, the 16 entities that compose our intelligence services, and spoken for by
the then-master of that intelligence community, George Tenet, the director of
Central Intelligence, and vouchsafed multiple times by his deputy, the DDCI,
John McLaughlin. But it came from a much wider array, Amy. It came from Israel.
It came from France. It came from Jordan. It came from Germany. Indeed, it came
from almost every intelligence service that, at one time or another, had fed
into the U.S. process with regard to Iraq. And frankly, we were all wrong. Was
the intelligence politicized in addition to being wrong at its roots?
Absolutely. And the leader of that politicization was the vice president of the
United States, Richard Cheney.
NORMAN SOLOMON: Well, we just heard Colonel Wilkerson say that "we were all wrong." I’m quoting him here from a few minutes ago. In fact, we were not all wrong. As a matter of fact, many experts and activists and researchers, from the get-go, in 2002, were saying that the administration case for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was full of holes, and many guests on Democracy Now! demolished those claims from the Bush administration in real time. The organization where I work, the Institute for Public Accuracy, put out many news releases documenting the falsities coming from Colin Powell’s office and the entire administration, including the week that he gave his now-infamous speech at the United Nations. We had U.N. weapons inspectors like Scott Ritter and Hans von Sponeck demolishing many of those claims being made, again, in real time.
So, what we’ve heard again today—and I think it’s very disappointing—from the former chief of staff here of Colin Powell is the reiteration of these supposedly exculpatory, actually, excuses for just following orders. And I could condense what Colonel Wilkerson just said about Colin Powell’s role in the lead up to the war in Iraq: "We were just following orders, and Dick Cheney made us to it." No, Dick Cheney didn’t make you do it. There’s something called resignation. There’s something called speaking up and the First Amendment. There are a lot of dead Americans and many more Iraqis because of the silence and the following of orders when we look at what actually took place.
Now, one of the most important facts is that, 10 years later, an ongoing legacy of Colin Powell’s behavior—and, unfortunately, of our guest, as well, and the entire upper echelons of the Bush administration—is a pattern of impunity—impunity to lie, impunity to deceive and distort, impunity that is personal, that is professional and is governmental. And that kind of impunity, which has caused so much death and misery in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere, is being fast-forwarded, is prefigurative for where we are now. And so, even today, although what’s done is done, we might say, the failure of people like Colin Powell to step up and say, "Look, not only was I wrong, but in planning and implementing aggressive war, I violated the Nuremberg Principles" — if we could get those kind of forthright statements from these former top officials, we could look at the agenda building for war on Iran in a more understanding light.
AMY GOODMAN: Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, your response?
COL. LAWRENCE WILKERSON: I don’t want to get into an on-screen argument with someone who makes comments as if he’d never been in government a day in his life or never been in—associated with power at this level. But I will say, first of all, that when I said "we," quote-unquote, I meant those in government, not people like him or Scott Ritter or anybody else who were protesting that Iraq didn’t have WMD at the time.
And when you look at the entire situation and you understand that the Congress of the United States had blessed the October 2002 NIE from which Powell’s presentation emanated; when you look at the president of the United States, the vice president of the United States, the secretary of defense, the Congress; when you look at the American people, who in polls showed 70 percent-plus agreed that Saddam Hussein had WMD, it’s not enough to say that Dick Cheney and Colin Powell and others failed in their responsibility to the American people or to their own government. There were a lot of people … to rationalize or excuse. I’m just saying that there were a lot of people who had the same view that Colin Powell basically presented at the United Nations. And those people were in other countries, too—in Israel, in Jordan, in Germany, in France—because they shared their intelligence with us, and they shared their views as to whether or not the DCI, George Tenet, was basically right in asserting that Saddam Hussein still had weapons of mass destruction.
NORMAN SOLOMON: You know, let’s get real here. You know, let’s get real about this --- because the public and the media and so many others, who did not, in terms of journalism, serve their basic function, were being fed a continuous barrage of messages from Cheney’s office, from the White House, from the State Department under former General Powell, telling them, insisting, as occurred at the United Nations, that there were weapons of mass destruction. This belief among the public didn’t come from the sky; it came from the administration. We had the Congress passing this green light for war almost four months before the Powell speech at the U.N., because they had been fed and pushed and pulled, and often expediently, they went with this story that had been peddled through the mass media. We had so many networks and newspapers, including The New York Times and The Washington Post, front-paging stuff that was fed to them, duplicitous, mendacious—mendacious stories that were fed by the administration. So, now to say, "Well, it wasn’t just us at the administration; other people believed it," people believed it because they were propagandized by the administration, with massive assistance from the mass media.
And today we’ve got to look at the reality that we are in a repetition
compulsion disorder cycle. After Powell spoke at the U.N., Susan Rice, the current U.N. ambassador from the United States,
immediately praised the statement from Powell that proved weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq. We had bogus hearings from now-Vice President Joe Biden, who chaired
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, excluding testimony from those who had
contrary information that would challenge the push to war. We’ve had John Kerry, now Secretary of State, who
voted for and propagandized on national television for the invasion of Iraq.
So let’s look at where we are.
Tomorrow, a hearing for John Brennan—
COL. LAWRENCE WILKERSON: You’re making my point.
NORMAN SOLOMON: —who is being pushed as a CIA director, someone engaging in
aggressive war, the use of drones and so forth. And let me say that my
colleagues at RootsAction.org
are asking you to sign up at RootsAction.org to challenge that nomination.
AMY GOODMAN: Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson?
COL. LAWRENCE WILKERSON: Now, you’re making my point. I find it very difficult to,
in the whole, say that all of those entities that you just described to include
the American people were led down the primrose path by the propaganda flowing
out of the White House and the Congress and elsewhere. That presents a picture
of a pretty purblind, apathetic, ignorant public, representatives in the
government and elsewhere. I can’t support that kind of broad-brush painting of
the situation.
AMY GOODMAN: There was a million people in the streets protesting.
NORMAN SOLOMON: Where did they get the idea there were weapons of mass
destruction? Did they get it from their everyday lives? Did they get it from
their PTA? No—
COL. LAWRENCE WILKERSON: They probably got it from the same place a lot of people in
the government got it—
NORMAN SOLOMON: —they got it from the administration, that was peddling
that line for years as agenda building for war.
COL. LAWRENCE WILKERSON: —which was that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass
destruction, had used them against his own people. No one thought he would get
rid of them, since his number-one enemy, Iran, was kept at bay, certainly in
part, because he possessed them. I think there was a pretty good feeling across
the world, not just in the United States, that Saddam Hussein had weapons of
mass destruction. And by the way, there is no question, I don’t think, in
anyone’s mind, that once the international sanctions were off Saddam Hussein
and once the international focus was off of him, he would go right back to
building weapons of mass destruction again, including a pursuit of a nuclear
weapon. So, let’s not make this too much of a—of, essentially, a calumny on the
American people, their representatives in the Congress and all of those in the
government.
AARON MATÉ: OK, so, let’s step back a bit and look at what we knew at the time. There was a leaked document from the British government, and I want to get Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson’s response to this. This was the internal records of the British government, from the Downing Street Memo. It says, "There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. [President] Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy." So, basically, an internal—a government official in Britain reporting that the Bush administration, from as early as 2002, was set on war. Lawrence Wilkerson?
COL. LAWRENCE WILKERSON: I think that’s a fair approximation. Of course, I didn’t know that at the time, nor did Secretary Powell know that at the time, with respect to the specific comments from the British. But having studied what the British did, what Prime Minister Blair did, what MI5 and MI6 did and others associated with this rush to war, I’m—I was first impressed by the way the British were going after accountability for their part in it; I’m now depressed by the fact that the Chilcot report, for example, seems to have been indefinitely postponed. I was eagerly awaiting reading it, because I think the British have an even bigger problem than we do in terms of the way their parliamentary government, with a party in a majority like they hadn’t seen in years, led that country to war, and led that country to war basically on the prime minister’s assertions, fed by the intelligence community in the U.K., that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, even with such dramatic comments as, you know, they could be used within 45 minutes. The complicity of the U.K. in this business with the United States, despite the special relationship, bothers me, as a citizen, as an admirer of the British.
AMY GOODMAN: Norman Solomon.
NORMAN SOLOMON: "We can’t wait for a smoking gun to become a mushroom cloud." And Secretary of State Powell, as well as Colonel Wilkerson and others at the top of the administration, knew or should have known that that was extreme, duplicitous propaganda trying to stampede the country into war.
Now, these are real intelligent people running the State Department and the White House, and they are very savvy. And if we at the Institute for Public Accuracy and many other independent researchers could point out in real time that these WMD claims from the U.S. government were full of holes and had no credibility, why couldn’t these agencies, with multibillion-dollar budgets and a lot of brain trust, come clean? And the fact is, they didn’t want to come clean. They were part of the war propaganda apparatus.
AMY GOODMAN: Colonel Wilkerson?
COL. LAWRENCE WILKERSON: I don’t disagree with what you just said. I don’t disagree that there should have been a hell of a lot better job done by what is now a $65-plus billion intelligence community. And incidentally, I don’t think it’s doing a much better job today than it did then. Dollars do not buy you intelligence. But at the same time, let me just say, I didn’t see a single one of your reports. So, nobody called me from your group.
AMY GOODMAN: Norman, let Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson respond. And,
Colonel Wilkerson, I think you made the point earlier that—when you said that
Norman Solomon clearly wasn’t in government, suggesting that "you don’t know what it’s like to be in the
bubble that we’re in when we are there," is what I heard you saying.
So, when you say, you know, "How come you didn’t come to us?" what is
it like to be in that bubble, especially as you reflect back and see the
direction you went in and regret it?
COL. LAWRENCE WILKERSON: Let me—let me
describe that bubble to you, for what I perceive to be the bubble around
President Obama right now and the man he has nominated to be CIA director, John
Brennan. What’s happening with drone strikes around the world right now is, in
my opinion, as bad a development as many of the things we now condemn so
readily, with 20/20 hindsight, in the George W. Bush administration. We are
creating more enemies than we’re killing. We are doing things that violate
international law. We are even killing American citizens without due process
and have an attorney general who has said that due process does not necessarily
include the legal process. Those are really scary words.
These things are happening because
of that bubble that you just described. You
can’t get through that bubble. You can’t get through the Brennans. You can’t
get through the Clappers. You can’t get through the Hillary Clintons. You can’t
get through the Bob Gates and the Leon Panettas and penetrate that bubble and
say, "Do you understand what you’re doing, both to American civil
liberties and to the rest of the world’s appreciation of America, with these
increased drone strikes that seem to have an endless vista for future?"
This is incredible. And yet, I know how these things happen. I know how these
bubbles create themselves around the president and cease and stop any kind of
information getting through that would alleviate or change the situation, make
the discussion more fundamental about what we’re doing in the world.
AMY GOODMAN: So, Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, you’re against the
confirmation of John Brennan as director of Central Intelligence.
COL. LAWRENCE WILKERSON: I think we ought to have a really, really hard discussion
about what he represents and what he, because he represents it, will probably
take to the directorship of the CIA.
AMY GOODMAN: We’re going to leave it there. We want to—
NORMAN SOLOMON: Well, I’d like to invite Colonel Wilkerson to go to RootsAction.org,
sign up for our action alerts today to challenge the nomination of John Brennan
to run the CIA, and just to mention that the impunity of the past is
prefigurative for impunity of the present and the future. And I hope you’ll join
with so many millions of other Americans to actively and vocally oppose not
only this nomination of Brennan, but also the entire so-called war on terror,
which is impunity for war that is aggressive around the world.
AMY GOODMAN: Colonel Wilkerson, could you see yourself doing that?
COL. LAWRENCE WILKERSON: I’m already doing it.
AMY GOODMAN: I want to thank you both for being with us. Colonel
Lawrence Wilkerson served as chief of staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell
from 2002 to 2005. Norman Solomon, founding director of Institute for
Policy—Public Accuracy, co-founder of RootsAction.org; among his books, War
Made Easy: How Presidents and Pundits Keep Spinning Us to Death. This is Democracy
Now! We’ll be back in a minute.
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